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Can We Know
God is Real?

By Roy Clouser

N

o one in the Western intellectual tradition
can ask the question posed in my title without
reference to Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus. In that
work Plato tried to sort out how we could tell those
beliefs which are mere opinions from ones which
we are entitled to be certain of. It was only those
beliefs, the ones of which we could be certain, that
he thought deserved to be called “knowledge.” And
notice that what he was after was certainty what
Dr. Roy A. Clouser, Emeritus Professor of
Philosophy and Religion at The College of New
Jersey, Trenton, authored The Myth of Religious
Neutrality (Notre Dame Press, l991), Knowing
With the Heart (Notre Dame Press, l999), and
numerous articles.

we’re entitled to. So it’s not just a matter of our
feeling certain; the guy who feels lucky may believe
he’s going to win the lottery today, but that won’t
entitle him to be certain of it. (As a matter of fact,
if you look at the statistics, it’s probably close to
certainly not true.) So Plato’s question was “how
do we tell genuine certainty from mere opinion?”
As we think about this question and the answers
that have been given to it, it might be good to keep
in mind some things that are naturally taken by
everyone to be certainly true. For example, no
doubt you are all sure of your name, address, and
telephone number. But Plato and the mainstream
Western intellectual tradition following him
say you’re wrong! Amazingly, that tradition has
concluded that not only beliefs such as your name,
address, and telephone number, but also your
belief that this session is now in progress—and
that there is a seat under your butt—are all things
you can’t know for sure!
Where that tradition came out on this question
can be summarized this way: you’re entitled
(justified, warranted) in being certain of a belief
if and only if it is either self-evident or proven.
Now you might be sitting there thinking “Well,
so what? It’s self-evident to me that my name,
address, telephone number are what they are.” But
the Western intellectual tradition is not through.
For although it has spent centuries debating the
topic of what counts as a proof, it has rarely ever reexamined self-evidency for the simple reason that
it was taken care of once and for all and by one of
the biggest names in philosophy ever, Aristotle.
In considering self-evident knowledge,
Aristotle reviews several possible objections against
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there being self-evident truth, and he argues
that every one of the objections fails. He then
concludes by saying, “So there is self-evident truth
and whatever is known in this way is a necessary
truth and cannot be false.” Keep in mind that a
necessary truth is a law (or a belief entailed by a
law). So he’s restricting self-evident truth to lawbeliefs alone. Moreover, he then adds that if you
know a law self-evidently, you’re infallibly right.
So he ends with two restrictions on the experience
of seeing a belief to be self-evidently true: it can
properly attach only to a law, and the resulting
belief must be one which cannot possibly be false.
Perhaps you can now see why he denied that your
beliefs about your name, address, and telephone
number, that there is a chair under your butt, and
that this session is in now in progress, can be selfevident beliefs. And, of course, it’s not just those
beliefs that are ruled out; so is the belief that God
exists.
There is still more to the Western tradition
about self-evident truth, however. In the 1600s,
two more very influential thinkers, Descartes and
Locke, added yet another restriction to genuinely
self-evident belief. They said that a self-evident
belief is one which, when understood by any
normal person, is seen by that person to be selfevidently true. So I call their added restriction the
“everybody requirement.” (In fact, this additional
requirement acquired such widespread acceptance
that it came to be regarded as the definition of a selfevident truth.) This means, of course, that if any
normal, adult human being doesn’t see a particular
belief to be self evidently true, then it is not. So
this restriction, too, rules out your name, address,
and telephone number, that this session is now in
progress, and that God exists. And it is because of
this restriction that people for centuries have been
asking Christians for their proof of God’s existence.
They have said, in effect, “You claim to know God
exists, but it’s obviously not self-evident. So where is
your proof?” And, unfortunately, many Christians
have taken that bait and tried to construct proofs.
Now while I think it can be shown that not a single
one of those proofs succeeds, that isn’t why I called
those attempts unfortunate. I said “unfortunately”
because I think there are good reasons to say that
whatever could be proven would thereby not be God.
Let me explain.
God as revealed in Scripture is the creator of
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everything in the cosmos, “seen or unseen.” So
that includes the laws we use to prove beliefs or
theories. For that reason, trying to construct a
proof of God’s existence inadvertently lowers God
from being the creator of all laws to a being who is
subjected to those laws. Here’s the same point put
another way. Whatever can be proven using the
laws of proof—whether mathematical or logical—
is not the creator of the laws of proof by whom they
were brought into existence. So without realizing
it, the thinkers who tried to prove God’s existence
did him no favor. Instead, they unintentionally
demoted him to what is in fact a creaturely level of
existence. And this is why I say that whatever can
be proven would thereby not be God.

God as revealed in
Scripture is the creator of
everything in the cosmos,
“seen or unseen.” So
that includes the laws we
use to prove beliefs or
theories. For that reason,
trying to construct a
proof of God’s existence
inadvertently lowers God
from being the creator of
all laws to a being who is
subjected to those laws.
Now perhaps some of you are thinking that the
answer to the question of how we know God is “by
faith.” Many people nowadays, when asked how
they know God is real, are heard to say, “That’s
part of my faith.” This answer has the merit of
not falling into the trap of offering a proof, but I
must say at once that I don’t think that’s right. It is
not the way New Testament writers use the word

“faith.” Instead, they use it to mean exactly what
you and I mean by it in our every day discourse.
We ordinarily mean trusting someone to keep a
promise, and they mean trusting God to keep his
promises. But since you’d already have to believe a
person exists in order to trust that person, the trust
can’t be that there is such a person. And that’s true
whether that person is another human or God.
Since this is an important point, let me cite briefly
one place where the New Testament confirms it.
At the beginning of Hebrews 11 we read, “Now
faith is the basis for the things we hope for, the
grounds on which we believe and the things not
yet seen.” See my point? Faith has to do with
trusting God for the things he has promised us but
which haven’t yet been realized, not God’s own
reality. Further on, this same chapter adds this
remark: “Without faith it’s impossible to please
God because whoever would come to God, must
believe that He exists...” —and here comes the
faith part— “…and that He rewards those who
seek Him.” The faith part, once again, is that He
will keep his promises by rewarding those who
seek Him. In the New Testament the chief of those
promises is our resurrection; the promise that just
as Christ was raised from the dead, so too we will
be raised from the dead and will live forever in His
kingdom on this earth. That hasn’t happened yet,
but meanwhile we trust God’s promises that he
will bring it about. So I conclude that faith in God
won’t answer the question of how we know God
exists because we’d already have to believe he exists
in order to trust Him.
If you are tempted at this point to think that
the entire subject of mere opinion versus justified
certainty is foreign to the New Testament, and so
should be off limits rather than taken seriously,
then you need to know that its writers do at times
make the distinction between mere belief and
knowing for sure. There are places in the New
Testament where its writers clearly do distinguish
mere opinion from certitude (Luke 1.1, 10.11;
John 6.69; Rom. 2.2; I Tim. 1.4; I Jn. 4.16). So
it is significant that they, like the prophets before
them, insist that we know God.
So what are we to say about that claim? If
we don’t believe God is real because it’s proven,
it’s ruled out as self-evident, and it’s not a matter
of faith, how then can it be knowledge? What I
want to propose is that our knowledge of God’s

reality is self-evident after all. I want to back that
proposal with arguments to show that it’s the three
restrictions on self-evidency that are in trouble,
not belief in God.
Let’s examine these restrictions further, taking
them in reverse order.
First, the “everybody requirement.” Descartes
and Locke want us to believe that unless everybody
agrees that a belief is self-evident, it’s not. So I ask,
Is the “everybody requirement” self-evident? And
the answer has to be “no” because it is not to me. So
even if I’m the only person who doesn’t see it as selfevident, the restriction fails its own requirement.
Of course, it could still count as knowledge if it
could be proven. So can it be proven? The answer
can only be that it’s impossible to prove because
“everyone” has to include all the dead and the
unborn. As hard as it would be to canvass the six
billion people now living on earth, that’s nothing
compared to canvassing the dead and the unborn.
Therefore, the requirement that for a belief to be
self-evidently certain everybody has to see it as so,
is itself neither self-evident nor proven. Thus, it is
not knowledge; it is merely somebody’s opinion.
What about Aristotle’s requirement that selfevidency attaches only to necessary truths? Well,
that’s not self-evident to me either, and no one’s
ever even tried to prove it, so it fails the “everybody
requirement.” But that’s not all. It also fails its own
requirement because the requirement that a selfevident belief be a necessary truth is not itself a
necessary truth. It neither has a self-contradictory
denial, nor is it entailed by a necessary truth. And
the whole while that this restriction fails to acquit
itself, we and everyone else in fact experience our
normal perceptions of the world around us to
be self-evidently true (like the chair being under
our butt and the fact that this session is now in
progress).
Finally, let’s consider the requirement that
to be self-evidently true a belief would have to
be infallibly true. My first reaction is to say that
infallibility belongs only to God, and for humans
to desire it is an instance of sin. There is nothing
about us that is infallible. Normal perception
reliably gives us truth, but it is not infallible.
Reasoning can also give us truth, but it is not
infallible either. Just so, there is no reason to doubt
that intuitions of self-evidency give us truth, but
they do so without having to be infallible. There
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is nothing about us that just can’t be wrong. But
that doesn’t matter because we don’t need to be
infallible in order to be certain. To see why this
is so, take the example of normal perception. You
and I know that our perceptual capabilities are not
infallible; we know that we can be fooled and that
there are such things as hallucinations and realistic
dreams. But you are certain that you’re hearing (or
reading) these words right now, aren’t you? And
you are certain that you’re sitting here. You don’t
have to be infallible to know those things any more
than you have to be infallible to know that one
and one make two, to know your name, address,
and telephone number …. or to know God.
The upshot of all this is that instead of letting
the grand masters of the intellectual tradition sit
on the top of Mt. Olympus and send down orders
about what they will permit us to count as selfevident, they should be quiet and let us tell them
what we in fact experience to be self evident. (If
you think that last sentence was hyperbole, it’s
wasn’t. Oxford philosopher Anthony Quentin, in
his book Metaphysics, says that restrictions have to
be put on self-evidency, or people will be telling
us that their moral and religious beliefs are self
evident.) The unmitigated arrogance of that!
But is this idea of self-evidency really the same
as the experience of conversion as described in the
New Testament? To see that this is so, recall that
experiencing a belief to be self-evident has long
been described in visual metaphors by those who
wrote about it. Philosophers, mathematicians, and
logicians, etc., have spoken about “seeing” the
truth or about being “enlightened,” for example.
So I call your attention to the ways the New
Testament speaks in these same visual metaphors
about acquiring belief in God: it speaks of the
“eyes” of our “understanding” being opened, about
the “light of the gospel” shining into “hearts that
had been darkened.” It speaks of the Holy Spirit
as removing a person’s “blindness” so that he or
she sees the gospel to be the truth about God from
God. In these ways it clearly makes belief in God’s
reality a result of experience: the experience of
directly seeing it to be the truth. So I conclude
that what has been called self-evidency in math
and logic is the same sort of experience as what is
called “enlightenment” in the New Testament.
Let me add, however, that putting our belief
in God’s reality on this basis doesn’t mean we
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can never have doubts or misgivings about that
experience. That happens with respect to truths of
math and logic, and with respect to normal sense
perceptions, and it can happen with respect to
belief in God. Nor does saying that God is known
because his reality is self-evident mean that we
can’t sometimes feel far away from God. That is
every believer’s experience. But it does mean that
the basis upon which we claim to know God’s
reality is the same as that upon which we know
that one and one make two and that this address is
now in progress.
I’ll close by reading from two writers who saw
all this clearly. The first is John Calvin, who puts
it this way:
As to the question “how shall we be persuaded
that scripture came from God,” it’s just the
same as if we were asked “how shall we learn
to distinguish light from darkness, white from
black, sweet from bitter?” Scripture bears upon
the face of it as clear evidence of its truth as do
white and black of their color, sweet and bitter
of their taste.” (Inst. 1.7.2)
Those who strive to build up firm faith
in scripture by argument are doing things
backward. Even if anyone could clear God’s
sacred word from man’s evil accusations, He will
not at the same time imprint upon their hearts
the certainty that piety requires. For unbelieving
men, religion seems to stand by opinion alone.
And so in order not to believe anything foolishly
or lightly, they wish and demand rational proof
that Moses and the prophets spoke by divine
inspiration. But I reply that the testimony of
the Spirit is more excellent than all reasoning.
Scripture carrying its own evidence along with
it deigns not to submit to proofs and arguments
but owes the full conviction with which we
ought to receive it to the testimony of the Spirit
of God.” (Inst. 1.7.4)

Blaise Pascal takes the same position but phrases it
another way:
We know truth not only by reasoning but also
by the heart, and it is in this last way that we
know first principles; and reason, which has no
art in it, tries in vain to impugn them.… [For
example] we know we do not [now] dream…
however impossible it is for us to prove it by
reason…. The knowledge of first principles of
space, time, motion and number is as sure as any

of those we can get by reasoning. And reason
must trust these intuitions of the heart and base
every argument upon them.” (Pensees, trans. AJ
Krailsheimer [London: Penguin, 1966], 58)

He then closes the same paragraph this way:
[T]herefore those to whom God has imparted
religion by intuition are fortunate, and justly
convinced. (Remember, justified belief is
knowledge.)

My conclusion, then, is that when we are asked
“how do we know God’s real?” the right answer
is that his existence is self-evident to us. And if
someone else replies “Well, it’s not to me,” the
answer to that is, “Right. And that’s why you don’t
believe it. But there is a way you can find out if it
is. You can try reading the Gospel of John and see
if you find anything in it to be self-evident truth.”
The rest is in God’s hands.
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